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NOTE
THE DESIGN INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY
ACT OF 1991: EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR THE
AESTHETIC ASPECTS OF USEFUL ARTICLES
Design cannot be adequately defined in the abstract; it is best described as
a creative decision-making process.' Through the process, a designer conceptu-
alizes and adapts an idea into some tangible form capable of reproduction.
2
Commercially successful products must be useful to consumers. However, de-
signers consider more than just product utility when designing a product for
commercial sale. Industrial designers attempt to design products that are attractive
to consumers, easy to use, safe to have and to operate, easy and cheap to
manufacture, and simple to repair.3
Industrial designers now consider the merger of aesthetic and utilitarian
factors into a marketable product to be their most important design parameter.
4
It is the merger of what a product must do with how the product looks that
distinguishes true industrial design from mere artistic endeavor. 5 The nexus
between utility and appearance in industrial designs significantly impacts a prod-
uct's success in the marketplace, because most consumer needs can be filled by
any number of similar items, and appearance enhances consumer acceptance of
a particular product within a larger field.6 This consumer acceptance is evidenced
by the fact that aesthetically pleasing products outsell less attractive products
with similar functions. 7 As a result, work on the functional aspects of products
yields simpler, more efficient designs, while unique looking designs are developed
to make products more marketable.'
The threat of design piracy becomes more significant as attractive designs
become more successful in the marketplace. "Design pirates" copy the design of
an already existing product and market a product which is similar in appearance,
but less costly, since the development costs have already been incurred by the
design's original creator.9 Design piracy poses a number of problems for industrial
designers. Obviously, a less expensive product can destroy the market for its
1. Christopher P. Bussert, Copyright Law: A Review of the "Separability Test" and a Proposal
For New Design Protection, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 59, 63 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection For Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. Rv. 887,
890 (1988).
4. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright
in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. Rv. 706, 739 (1983).
5. Id.
6. Bussert, supra note 1, at 63-64.
7. Brett S. Sylvester, Comment, The Future of Design Protection in the United States: An
Analysis of the Proposed Domestic System in View of Recent Developments in the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, and Australia, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 261 (1986).
8. Bussert, supra note 1, at 64.
9. See ERICH KAUFER, THE EcoNOm~cs OF TiE PATENT SYSTEM 19 (1989).
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more expensive predecessor. 0 However, designers are not the only ones who
suffer due to design pirates; consumers are harmed in a number of ways. The
development of innovative technology is slowed because designers lose the eco-
nomic incentive to take the risk of developing new designs." This harms consum-
ers, since they will not have the finest technology with the most attractive
appearance at their disposal. Even if designers elect to keep producing at their
present rate, indistinguishable copied products can confuse consumers as to the
product's origin, thereby preventing them from buying the products they desire. 2
While these factors may not prevent all designers from producing new and
innovative products,' 3 they demonstrate that some level of protection for the
aesthetic aspects of useful objects is necessary to provide industrial designers with
the incentive to produce innovative technology. 4 However, American intellectual
property law has never determined what protection, if any, should be afforded
to newly created industrial designs. '5 Intellectual property protection provides
inventors of useful objects with a short-term monopoly if they elect not to
license16 their designs, and a short term oligopoly if they elect to license. While
this serves the designers' needs, the countries that have extended monopoly
protection to the appearance of industrial designs have found that competition
declined as a result. 7 Since this is inconsistent with the American economic
structure, but accepted if the ideas being protected are sufficiently innovative,
design protection for aesthetic appearance must be awarded only to those indus-
trial designs that require such protection for their survival.
Attempts to protect the appearance of useful products have been stymied
for a variety of reasons. It is impractical to award protection on the basis of the
creative process that goes into conceiving the design," so protection must be
based upon the product's form. However, protection of a product's basic form
often does too much to protect the product's basic function. Such protection
would afford a monopoly that the designer does not deserve because the design's
function presents a minimal display of creativity or originality.' 9 The American
intellectual property system contains three prongs, each of which could be used
to protect the appearance of industrial designs.20 However, these prongs protect
form and function under separate laws, and do not effectively protect form or
function where they are integrally and inseparably combined. 2 Legislation has
10. Bussert, supra note 1, at 65.
11. Id. at 66.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
14. See Sylvester, supra note 7.
15. See infra notes 25-85 and accompanying text.
16. Licensing is the transferral of the right to use, manufacture, or sell an intellectual property
right to someone who does not hold the right to do so under the patent or copyright statutes.
17. Sylvester, supra note 7, at 263-64.
18. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1341, 1350 (1987).
19. Id. at 1348.
20. The three prongs of the American intellectual property system are patents, which provide
incentives for the development of novel product ideas; copyrights, which reward distinctive artistic
impressions; and trademarks, which protect distinctive characteristics of the product or its producer
to simplify its identification by the consumer. Lee B. Burgunder, Product Design Protection After
Bonito Boats: Where It Belongs and How It Should Get There, 28 AM. Bus. L. J. 1 (1990).
21. Dratler, supra note 3, at 891.
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been proposed to remedy this problem, 22 but none has ever been passed. Congress
has not passed these bills because it believes they stifle competition. 23 As a result,
American law provides no effective method of protecting the aesthetic features
of industrial designs.
This note reviews both the basis for protection afforded by the American
intellectual property system, and the most recent legislative attempt to protect
the aesthetic features of industrial designs. 24 Part I reviews the protection which
can be obtained through the American intellectual property system, focusing on
the problems arising out of design patent and copyright protection for the
appearance of useful articles. Part II examines the Design Innovation and
Technology Act, and Part III evaluates the Design Act in light of the deficiencies
in protection for the appearance of industrial designs, and in light of the
protection that should be afforded to such designs. Part IV concludes that, while
the Act as proposed is an improvement on the present system, it would be more
in line with accepted intellectual property protection principles if it incorporated
a clearer definition as to which designs fall into the Design Act's purview, and
forced those designs that merit the Act's protection to pay for it with annual
renewal fees.
I. PROTECTION FOR THE APPEARANCE OF USEFUL ARTICLES
THROUGH THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to enact legislation "[tlo
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. '" 25 Congress has utilized this
power to enact both patent legislation, which grants exclusive rights to items of
invention, and copyright legislation, which secures exclusive rights in literary and
artistic property. 26 While Federal patent law has expressly provided for the
protection of ornamental designs since 1842,27 and copyright protection for
ornamental design is also available 2 neither of these systems afford adequate
protection to industrial designers.
A. DESIGN PATENTS
Federal patent legislation permits the issuing of design patents to protect
"new, original, and ornamental" designs. 29 Design patent protection attempts to
''encourage ornamentation and beautification in manufactured articles so as to
increase their sales appeal and satisfy the aesthetic sense of the purchaser.''30
To qualify for design patent protection, a design must be new, original,
ornamental, incorporated into an article of manufacture, and in compliance with
22. See supra note 78.
23. Dratler, supra note 3, at 907.
24. Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991, H.R. 1790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter "Design Act"].
25. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8
26. Steve W. Ackerman, Note, Protection of the Design of Useful Articles: Current Inadequacies
and Proposed Solutions, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1043 (1983).
27. Denicola, supra note 4, at 712-13 n.30.
28. Id.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988).
30. Rains v. Cascade Indus., 269 F. Supp. 688, 693 (D.N.J. 1967) (citation omitted) rev'd on
other grounds, 402 F.2d 241 (3rd Cir. 1968).
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the general provisions of the Federal patent statute."a Designs that are both
"new" and "original" are commonly referred to as "novel", and only novel
designs qualify for design patent protection. 32 A design is novel if it has not been
previously anticipated by another or the inventor. 33 A design is not novel if it
was known about, used, or patented in the United States prior to the present
application, patented in a foreign country more than one year prior to the present
application, abandoned by the inventor, described in a patent granted on a
separate application, or invented by another person. 34 Designs are ornamental if
they satisfy an "ordinary observer" standard, which requires the article to exhibit
rudimentary aesthetic skill and artistic conception when viewed through the eyes
of an ordinary observer.
3
The most significant of the other terms and conditions the design must
comply with is the non-obvious standard. 6 A design may only be patented if it
is non-obvious. In the context of the appearance of useful products, non-obvious
means that one with "ordinary skill in the art" of designing such articles would
not have previously recognized the new design as a whole within the existing
art. 37 In Graham v. John Deere,3 the Supreme Court established a three-pronged
approach for determining whether a design was non-obvious. The factfinder must
determine the "scope and content of the prior art," identify the differences
between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and resolve the level of
ordinary skill of designers in the pertinent art. 39 These factors are then balanced
to determine whether the design is non-obvious.4 If the balance shows that the
design is non-obvious, and the other statutory provisions are met, a design patent
is issued for a term of fourteen years. 4'
While design patents can protect the appearance of useful articles, designers
who seek this protection encounter a number of problems associated with the
patent system in general, and with this standard in particular. Designers applying
for design patents must endure a long application process which imposes high
transaction costs;42 there is no guarantee of sufficient protection to offset the
transaction costs. Protection against infringement does not begin until the patent
is issued, and some designs may become obsolete after the application is filed
but before a patent is issued.4 3 Once the patent is issued, protection begins; but
validity and infringement are difficult to prove,4 largely because the non-obvi-
ousness standard is difficult to meet. The primary indicia of non-obviousness
involve such concepts as improved usefulness, unexpected results of operation,
31. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988).
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
33. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1048.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(g) (1988).
35. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1048.
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
37. Id.; Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1048.
38. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1988).
42. Brown, supra note 18, at 1356; Bussert, supra note 1, at 68; Dratler, supra note 3, at 894.
43. Sylvester, supra note 7, at 268.
44. Brown, supra note 18, at 1356-57; Dratler, supra note 3, at 893-94.
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and a mechanically different product form5.4  While these considerations are
helpful in evaluating a product's utility,46 they do not assist in determining the
uniqueness of a product's appearance, since appearance is a combination of
known forms with no significant advance in utility.4 7 The commercial success of
a product does not assist in evaluating the obviousness of its appearance, as it
is difficult to quantify how much good design contributes to the commercial
success of a product. 4 Therefore, the holder of a design patent has a difficult
time withstanding a challenge that his design was obvious, and many infringement
suits are defeated on this basis.
Where design patents are issued, they advance the policy considerations
underlying the protection of industrial designs, and they afford a monopoly of
limited duration so as to deter competitive imitation without precluding it.9
However, design patents reward a significant level of creativity, and as a result
they are difficult to obtain in any context.50 With the problems associated with
proving the non-obviousness of the appearance of an industrial design, design
patents are virtually impossible to obtain in this context.5 The practical unavail-
ability of design patent protection for the appearance of industrial designs suggests
that the legislature has determined that most industrial designs do not deserve
that level of protection. 2
B. COPYRIGHTS
While copyright protection extends to some works of art incorporated into
useful articles, Congress has indicated that the general province of industrial
design does not merit copyright protection. 3 In general, copyrights are much
easier and less expensive to obtain than patents.54 Unlike patents, copyrights have
no requirement of novelty or merit, but they preclude designers from tying up
the usefulness of an object by preventing the copying of its overall shape.55 This
is a lower standard of protection, as it protects the expression of ideas but not
the ideas themselves.56 One who independently arrives at the same form of
expression as that protected by a copyright does not infringe on the copyright
and may use the expression for his own benefit. 57 Furthermore, a second designer
can utilize the ideas used by a previous designer, so long as he expresses those
ideas in an unique fashion. 8 The Copyright Office refuses to register designs
after they receive design patent protection.59
45. Sylvester, supra note 7, at 266 n.29.
46. Id.
47. See Dratler, supra note 3, at 892.
48. Sylvester, supra note 7, at 266 n.30.
49. Brown, supra note 18, at 1355.
50. Id. at 1401.
51. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
52. Dratler, supra note 3, at 909-10.
53. Sylvester, supra note 7, at 269. See also H.R. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 55 (1976).
54. Burgunder, supra note 20, at 5.
55. Brown, supra note 18, at 1342.
56. Burgunder, supra note 20, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Bussert, supra note 1, at 69.
59. Denicola, supra note 4, at 712-13.
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Copyright protection extends to original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated.60 An original design must display only a minimum
of creative effort, and it is not subject to administrative or judicial examination
of artistic merit or aesthetic value. 6' "Works of authorship" expressly excludes
ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles,
and discoveriesA2 However, it includes "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works", 63
which includes works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as form, but not design
or utilitarian aspects are concerned 4 Designs of useful articles are only considered
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works if, and only to the extent that, they
incorporate artistic features that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
65
The Copyright Office has not extended copyright protection to industrial
designs, since this area involves a delicate balance between the need for protection
on the part of those who originate and invest in a design and the possible effect
of protection, if overextended, on restraining competition.66 However, the Su-
preme Court validated copyright protection for industrial design by holding in
Mazer v. Stein67 that artistic articles included in larger, utilitarian articles could
be copyrighted.68 Although Mazer provided no standard to differentiate between
uncopyrightable industrial designs and copyrightable works of art as embodied
in utilitarian objects,6 9 a separability standard evolved and was incorporated into
the 1976 amendment to the Copyright Act. The legislative history of this amend-
ment shows that the House Committee intended to extend copyright protection
to industrial designs where the product contained some element that is separable
from its utilitarian function. 70 As the Act points out, this occurs only when the
design can be identified separately and independently from the useful article. 7'
This separability may be either physical or conceptual, 7 and copyright protection
only extends to the extent that the appearance is separable from the article's
functional aspects .
7
The separability test has drawn the boundary line for the ability to copyright
at the point where function predominates over the aesthetics of an article.
74
However, in interpreting the separability test, different courts have come to
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
61. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1046.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
63. Id. at § 102(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
64. Id. at § 101 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
65. Id.
66. Brown, supra note 18, at 1352 (citation omitted).
67. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
68. Id. at 219.
69. Sylvester, supra note 7, at 270.
70. Gayle Coleman, The Protection of Useful Articles and the Elusive Concept of Conceptual
Separability: Brandir International Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 13 NOVA L. REv. 1417 (1989)
(quoting H.R. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 55 (1976)).
71. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
72. Bussert, supra note 1, at 79.
73. Dratler, supra note 3, at 895.
74. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1062.
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opposite conclusions as to the copyrightability of certain industrial designs. 7 A
gap in protection between copyright and patent coverage has evolved as a result
of these inconsistent interpretations. Because there is no subjective means to
determine what is "separable," courts have been reluctant to extend copyright
protection to the designs of articles that require difficult separability determina-
tions.76 This factor combines with the difficulty in obtaining design patents and
the low likelihood of maintaining their validity77 to ensure that many designs
which merit some level of coverage fail to receive protection.
II. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT ORNAMENTAL DESIGN
AND THE DESIGN INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY ACT OF 1991
As a result of inadequate protection for innovative industrial designs, there
have been numerous attempts to enact federal legislation to protect ornamental
designs. 71 The first of these proposals was made in 1914, 79 and the proposals
have varied greatly over the years.80 Some of these proposals passed one house
of Congress prior to 1937,1 but none were ever enacted. Congress ultimately
rejected each of these bills because of marketplace and administrative consider-
ations.8 2 One concern has been that design protection will grant a monopoly that
far exceeds that intended by the Constitution, 3 stripping the industrial design
market of competition." There has also been concern that allowing such protection
would place an unmanageable burden on the Copyright Office. 5
The most recent legislative attempt to protect ornamental designs is the
Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991.86 This Act protects designers or
75. Bussert, supra note 1, at 86; See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976),
rev'd 591 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the overall shape of a light fixture was barred from copyright
registration); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd
632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt buckles with sculpted surfaces were held to be copyrightable because
they had conceptually separable surfaces); Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc.,
No. 90c6933, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13752 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1992) (the appearance of mannequin
heads neither is physically nor conceptually separable from their display purposes).
76. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1051.
77. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
78. For a complete listing of past legislative proposals through 1975, see Hearings on H.R. 2223
Copyright Law Revision Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1007 (1975). To complete this
list, add H.R. 1790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 902, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 791,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1179, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 379, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); H.R. 1900, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2985, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R.
20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 4530, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); H.R. 206, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
79. H.R. 11321, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
80. See Bussert, supra note 1, at 74 n.67.
81. H.R. 11852, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (passed the House on July 2, 1930). See also S.
3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) and, Bussert, supra note 1, at 74 n.68.
82. Bussert, supra note 1, at 92.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 93; Dratler, supra note 4 at 907. In 1976, The Department of Justice supported this
position and was instrumental in ensuring that the 1976 proposals were never enacted. See Sylvester,
supra note 8, at 272. However, by 1985 the Department's position appeared to have reversed to
support increased protection for ornamental design. See ROGER B. ANDEWELT, ADDRESS To THE
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND CORYRIGHT SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (July 16, 1985)
reprinted in 30 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 739, at 319 (July 25, 1985).
85. Bussert, supra note 1, at 94.
86. H.R. 1790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Act was initially sponsored by Representative
Richard A. Gephardt D-Mo and has 72 co-sponsors through August 3, 1992.
Journal of Legislation
other owners of designs that make useful articles 7 attractive or distinctive in
appearance to the purchasing or using public."8 A number of designs are specif-
ically excluded from protection under the Act. 9
An application for registration must be made within one year after the date
on which the design is first made public, or protection under the Act will be
lost.90 Registration gives the owner of the design the exclusive right to make,
have made, or import, for sale or for use in trade, any useful article embodying
the design, 91 and to sell or distribute for sale or for use in trade any article
embodying that design. 92 These rights are transferable property rights93 which last
for ten years 94 and are not renewable. 95 Infringement occurs when anyone makes,
has made, imports, sells, or distributes an infringing article without the owner's
consent.96
87. A "useful article" is one which in normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. This definition includes
articles which are normally part of useful articles. Design Act, supra note 24, at § 1001(b)(2).
88. Id. at § 1001(a).
89. Section 1002 of the Design Act provides that
Protection under this chapter shall not be available for a design that is-
(1) not original;
(2) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, familiar symbol,
emblem, or motif, or other shape, pattern, or configuration which has become standard,
common, prevalent, or ordinary;
(3) different from a design excluded by paragraph (2) only in insignificant details or
in elements which are variants commonly used in the relevant trades;
(4) dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article;
(5) embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer or owner in the
United States or a foreign country more than 1 year before the date of the application
for registration under this chapter;
(6) composed of three-dimensional features of shape and surface with respect to men's
women's, and children's apparel, including undergarments and outerwear;
(7) a semiconductor chip product which is protected under chapter 9 of this title;
(8) an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or
embodied in such design; or
(9) for motor vehicle glass, including windshields and side and rear vision glass.
With respect to articles which are normally part of a larger useful article as defined in §1001(b)(2),
that portion of the article shape dictated by the mechanical interface, perimeter, or envelope restrictions
necessary to permit the physical and functional substitution of an article shall be considered to be a
design for which protection under this chapter is not available under paragraph (4). Id. at § 1002.
For purposes of § 1002 (1), a design is original if it is the result of the designer's creative efforts
that provides a distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining to similar articles which is more
than merely trivial and has not been copied from another source. Id. at § 1001(b)(l).
90. Id. at § 1010(a). "Made public" is defined as the time when a useful article embodying the
design is anywhere publicly exhibited, publicly distributed, or offered for sale or sold to the public
by the owner of the design or with the owner's consent. Id. at § 1010(b).
91. Id. at § 1008(l).
92. Id. at § 1008(2).
93. Id. at § 1020.
94. Id. at § 1005(a).
95. Id. at § 1005(c).
96. Id. at § 1009(a). An infringing article is any article the design of which has been copied
from a protected design, excluding illustrations and pictures of protected designs as well as articles
which embody only elements of the protected design which are not subject to protection. Id. at §
1009(e). Special rules apply to sellers and distributors, acts of infringement performed without
knowledge that .the design was protected, and acts incorporating an infringing article acquired in the
ordinary course of business into a separate product design. Id. at § 1009(b)-(d).
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The Act protects industrial designers against infringement in a variety of
ways. Injunctive relief is available as a remedy for infringement. 9 Compensatory
damages are available up to a limit of $50,000 or $1 per copy, whichever is
greater, or to the level of the infringer's profit from sales reasonably related to
the use of the claimant's design. 9 Punitive damages for infringement are not
available.9 The proposed legislation goes further toward protecting industrial
designs than does intellectual property protection, because it expressly protects
ornamental designs and provides extensive remedies in the event that the designer's
rights in the ornamental features are violated.
III. A COMPARISON OF THE DESIGN INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY ACT OF 1991 WITH THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SYSTEM: HOW THE ACT IMPROVES PROTECTION FOR DESIGNERS
AND HOW IT MISSES ITS MARK
The Design Innovation and Technology Act makes it procedurally easier for
industrial designers to obtain protection for the appearance of their designs than
it is for them to obtain design patents. The Design Act also goes a long way to
bridge the substantive gap created between patent and copyright protection,' °°
making it an improvement over our present day systems of protection. The Design
Act, however, still has some deficiencies which must be dealt with before it is
consistent with the policies that drive design protection law.
Most designers would prefer design patent protection to either copyright
protection or protection under the new Design Act, because design patent pro-
tection is more comprehensive.10' Nevertheless, the procedural difficulty in ob-
taining design patent protection deters inventors from attempting to obtain it.
An inventor must go through a lengthy administrative procedure to convince an
examiner that his design is novel and nonobvious.10 2 The patent office must
conduct an extensive search of the prior art in order to make this determination.0 3
The statutory minimum fees to go through this process are: $900 before the
patent is issued, plus $2,700 to retain the full term of protection.' 0 4 When relevant
prior art is found, as it usually is, there are additional charges associated with
filing the application and overcoming the examiner's objections. 0 5 Assuming the
applicant overcomes these objections, a design patent is issued, but not until
considerable time' 06 and money"07 have been expended. Once a patent is issued,
the holder will have difficulty enforcing it. Most infringement litigation results
97. Id. at § 1022.
98. Id. at § 1023(a)-(b).
99. Id. at § 1023(a).
100. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text.
102. Burgunder, supra note 20, at 5.
103. Bussert, supra note 1, at 68.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
105. Dratler, supra note 3, at 894.
106. "The average time needed to receive a patent is nineteen months . Burgunder, supra
note 20, at 5.
107. The average cost of obtaining a patent, including the necessary attorney's fees, can reach
the tens of thousands of dollars. Id.; Susan A. Dunn, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection
for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497, 504 (1986).
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in either invalidation of the patent that is the subject of the litigation,'s or in a
finding that the defendant did not infringe upon the patent.'09
Comparatively, copyright protection is much easier and less expensive to
obtain."10 The work need only be minimally creative and original to the creator
to receive protection."' Furthermore, there are no registration or notice require-
ments like those for patents, although there are advantages to both." 2 Once
copyright protection is secured, it lasts for the life of the author plus an additional
fifty years."' However, the level of protection that copyright affords to the
appearance of useful articles is questionable." 4 The registration procedures under
the Design Act are similar to those of copyright, "' which makes Design Act
protection preferable to copyright protection so long as it is broader in scope.
The Design Act provides substantive protection which falls somewhere be-
tween that afforded by design patents and that afforded by the Copyright Act.
The owner of a design patent can prevent others from making, using, or selling
the design," 6 which effectively gives the holder a monopoly over the manufacture,
use, and sale of the design for the length of the patent's term." 7 Therefore, while
protection is limited to the appearance of the design,"' the independent creation
of a design similar in appearance to a patented design can infringe upon the
108. If validity is raised as an issue, seven out of ten design patents are declared invalid. Brown,
supra note 18, at 1356.
109. Of those patents which are held valid, only half are found to have been infringed. Id.
110. Burgunder, supra note 20, at 5.
111. Id.
112. Id. While registration is not required for copyright protection, 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988 &
Supp. III 1992), registration provides benefits including evidentiary advantages, the right to statutory
damages, and the right to attorney's fees. Id. at §§ 408, 410, 412. Notice also provides certain
evidentiary advantages. Id. at § 401(d).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Copyright protection in works made for hire
(defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101) lasts for seventy-five years from the year of their first publication, or
one hundred years from the year of their creation, whichever expires first. Id. at § 302(c).
114. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
115. The Design Act provides for the form and location of notice, and does not remove protection
for removal of notice. Design Act, supra note 24, at § 1006. Failure to provide this notice will
prevent any recovery against a person who began an undertaking leading to infringement before
receiving written notice of the protection. Id. at § 1007(b). No injunction shall be issued with respect
to such an undertaking unless the owner of the protected design reimburses the other party for
reasonable expenses incurred before receiving written notice of the protection. Id. at § 1009(d). The
Design Act requires that the application contain:
(1) the name and address of the author or authors of the design;
(2) the name and address of the proprietor if different from the author;
(3) the specific name of the article;
(4) the date, if any, that the design was first made public, if such date was earlier
than the date of application;
(5) affirmation that the design has been fixed in a useful article; and
(6) such other information as may be required by the Administrator.
This information must be accompanied by a statement under oath by the applicant or his agent that
the design is original, was created by the designer named in the application, had not been previously
registered by the designer or his predecessor in title, and that the applicant is entitled to protection
under the act. Id. at § 1009(e). The application must also be accompanied by a pictorial representation
of the useful articles having sufficient views to show the design. Id. at § 1009(h). A determination
as to the validity of the application is made upon the filing of the application and the payment of
a reasonable fee to be determined by the Act's Administrator. Id. at §§ 1012(a), 1015.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
117. Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1010 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
118. Gorman Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871).
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patented design. In contrast, copyright protection gives the holder the exclusive
right to reproduce and distribute copies of the work, 1 9 to use the work as the
basis for a derivative work, 20 and to display pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works publicly.' 2' The right to manufacture the article is not protected,' 2 2 nor are
the utilitarian aspects of the product.' 23 All that is protected is the method of
expressing the creative idea; an expression of the same idea that is independently
arrived at is not protected by copyright.'1
Under the Design Act, infringement occurs when any person makes, has
made, imports, sells, or distributes for sale or for use in trade an infringing
article without the consent of the design's owner.' 25 As this provision covers
manufacture as well as use and reproduction of protected designs, it appears to
be closer to design patent protection than it is to copyright protection. However,
the Design Act expressly precludes the protection of ideas, procedures, processes,
systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries, regardless of
how they are embodied in a design.' 26 This demonstrates that what is protected
is the expression of a design, not the thoughts or ideas behind it, and makes the
Design Act more comparable to copyright. The fact that the Design Act does
not impose strict liability on those who copy from a design without the knowledge
that the design was protected, 27 also makes the protection afforded by the Design
Act closer to copyright protection than it is to patent protection.
While the protection of the appearance of useful articles under the Design
Act is similar to copyright protection, it is preferable to copyright protection
because it covers more items. A simple example is helpful to demonstrate this
concept. Designer A creates a special, artistic form of toaster, more pleasing to
the eye than the ordinary toaster because of its exterior design. The exterior
design is entirely a result of A's creativity, and its appearance is vastly different
from the prior design of toasters. A wants to apply for a design patent, but
concludes that a person with reasonable experience in the toaster design field
could have foreseen the possibility of this design. She then wants to pursue
copyright protection, but is denied this protection because the Copyright Office
finds that the overall shape of the toaster cannot be separated from its utility.' 2
Under the present system of design protection, A would be out of luck. However,
were the Design Act in effect, A would be able to protect her toaster design
under its provisions.' 29 Assuming that the design is not staple or commonplace,'30
119. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1),(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
120. Id. at § 106(2).
121. Id. at § 106(5).
122. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1049.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
124. Bussert, supra note 1, at 69.
125. Design Act, supra note 24, at §1008(a).
126. Id. at § 1002(7).
127. See supra note 96.
128. While this conclusion may be questionable, and it is possible that the opposite conclusion
could be reached, other courts have concluded that this is the case in an analogous situations. See
Pivot Point International, 1992 LEXIS 13752 at *5-*6 and Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939
(D.D.C. 1976).
129. See Design Act, supra note 24, at § 1001(a).
130. For more information on this standard, see infra notes 155-158.
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the exterior design of the toaster qualifies as original under the Act. 3' A toaster
is clearly considered a useful article, 13 2 and the appearance of the toaster makes
it distinctive in appearance. Therefore, it complies with the requirements necessary
for protection under the Design Act.
Given the fact that the Design Act will protect more designs, it is important
to consider whether the means by which it protects those designs is appropriate.
In making this determination, two considerations must be kept in mind. First,
copiers must be curtailed, as they compete "unfairly", and easy copying dis-
courages originality.' Allowing copying without restrictions is theoretically op-
timal from a socio-economic perspective, but it assumes that inventors, artists
and manufacturers will develop and sell new products knowing that they can be
costlessly imitated. 13 4 This is a questionable premise.3 5 Without the expectation
of monetary rewards flowing from their creative contributions, designers have
little incentive to design. 3 6 Besides this economic incentive, there is a moral
appeal to this type of protection. The rights to the fruits of one's labors and the
aversion to permitting the enrichment of another at the producer's expense are
powerful bases for preventing copying.
13 7
Second, people thrive on competition, and so does the economy.,"8 However,
the Design Act affords a short term monopoly to those who exercise their creative
talents, and monopolies are directly anti-competitive. Therefore, protection should
be afforded to the minimum extent necessary to sustain the economic incentive
to create without eliminating competition. Rephrased in economic terms, protec-
tion should be set at the level at which for each designer leaving the market
because he cannot receive protection for his efforts, another is induced to enter
the market by the prospect of having a protected design earning royalties. There
are moral considerations to this argument; it seems strange to suggest that we
should protect some but not all designers where we are not concerned about the
merits of the design. However, three factors minimize the effect of these consid-
erations. First, industrial designs are attributes of products, intended to assist in
their marketing, sale, and use.3 9 Therefore, the focus of the protection should
be on the product itself, and not its design.14' Otherwise, the incentive is for the
designer to create attractive products rather than effective products, and this is
obviously not desirable. Second, the threat of appropriation and unjust enrichment
is reduced because industrial designers generally work for large corporations, and
the emotional appeal for protection from unjust enrichment is not as applicable . '4
Third, while we are not concerned with the merit of the design, we are concerned
with its originality. Since designs are protected on the basis of originality,
originality becomes the functional equivalent of merit in this context. Where
131. See supra note 89.
132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
133. Brown, supra note 18, at 1386.
134. Burgunder, supra note 20, at 3.
135. Id.
136. KAUFER, supra note 9, at 19.
137. Denicola, supra note 4, at 722.
138. Brown, supra note 18, at 1386.
139. Dratler, supra note 3, at 913.
140. Id.
141. Denicola, supra note 4, at 726.
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patents are issued to protect those who created novel scientific application, this
protection is issued to those who create novel artistic applications. Whether the
artistic application is novel enough for protection is a necessary determination.
Even with these considerations in mind, it remains difficult to determine
where the limits of design protection should be placed. If the Design Act were
eliminated, designers would still have some benefit for being first in the market.
The first person to design an attractive product has a head start on the market,
giving that designer a monopoly until someone can duplicate his creation. Under
our present system, this is the only protection that a designer is guaranteed to
have. 142 This limited protection is often enough,
143 because oligopolistic industries144
contain inherent barriers to competition such as high capital costs. 45 However,
a head start only gives an advantage to those designers whose product succeeds
relatively quickly.'" If protection were based solely on the head start principle,
some designers might not enter the market because they are not guaranteed
protection until they reach the market and succeed in it. This reduces the level
of competition, and is an undesirable trend.
Just as the head start principle reduces competition by not adequately
protecting industrial designers, protection for all designs would stifle competition
by providing unnecessary protection. Diverse designs have advantages in satisfying
the diverse tastes of various consumers. 147 Duplication of designs is not necessarily
bad. Because the probability of any single design leading to success is low,
duplication allows a design more opportunities to succeed. 14 This reduces the
possibility that innovative design approaches will be overlooked, and allows the
achievement of a greater number of high quality inventions. 49 Since neither total
protection nor unrestricted competition satisfies the need for design protection
while advancing competition, the appropriate solution lies somewhere along the
vast continuum between these two points. Since attempting to determine the
appropriate level of protection renders an uncertain result, this determination is
best made by evaluating the components of design protection: the nature of the
design protected, and the length of time for which it is protected.
The Design Act protects designs created by the applicant which significantly
vary from the prior art, were not copied from the prior art, and make the useful
article either attractive or distinctive to the consumer. 150 These are precisely the
sort of designs which must be protected. Problems arise in determining which
designs are excluded from this category. First, designs which are dictated solely
by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it are excluded from design
142. Brown, supra note 18, at 1388.
143. Id.
144. Oligopolistic industries are controlled by a limited number of competitors. Since there is
more than one industry producing a product, it is not a monopoly. However, there are not enough
competitors for the industry to be perfectly competitive. Industries protected by patents and copyrights
are often oligopolistic rather than monopolistic, as the right to produce or use a product or artistic
impression may be sold to multiple parties.
145. KAUFER, supra note 9, at 20-21.
146. Brown, supra note 18, at 1388.
147. KAUFER, supra note 9, at 40.
148. Id. at 39.
149. Id.
150. Design Act, supra note 24, at § 1001.
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protection."' While this exclusion is appropriate, it is effectively useless, as few,
if any designs are dictated solely by function. For example, assume that a sports
car can be designed so that is pleasing to the eye, and has an extraordinarily low
coefficient of drag, which reduces wind resistance so that the car can travel five
miles per hour faster than any other car on the road. The car's exterior design
is predominantly dictated by function; only certain forms of design will produce
a lower coefficient of drag than those that are currently being used, and the
car's exterior must shield the driver and the mechanical equipment from the
elements and provide protection against collisions. In this and other instances
where function predominates over aesthetics in product design, the utilitarian
exclusion from design protection would be inapplicable.
One commentator has suggested a standard where the article would be
excluded from protection if it necessarily required a particular design in order to
perform its function.5 2 Admittedly, in those cases, design protection would extend
to the function itself, which is inappropriate because function can only be
protected by the patent system.'53 However, this proposal is also ineffective, as
few objects necessarily assume their particular design to perform their particular
function. 54 Returning to the sports car example, assume that its exterior design
has three purposes: reduce wind resistance to a greater extent than any car on
the road, protect the mechanical equipment from the weather, and protect the
passengers in the event of a collision. All of these functions can be adequately
served by a number of designs. Therefore, this standard would not allow design
protection for this car, as no one design is necessary.
Second, the Act denies design protection to staple or commonplace designs.'"
The Act's examples of staple or commonplace designs include standard geometric
figures, familiar symbols, emblems, or motifs, or other shapes, patterns or
configurations which have become standard, prevalent or ordinary. 5 6 Denying
protection to these articles is appropriate, but the standard for determining which
designs are commonplace is too indefinite to be meaningful. Returning to the
belt buckles protected in Kieselstein-Cord,5 7 one could argue that those designs
were little more than familiar symbols, patterns, or motifs. However, they are
none of these things when viewed in the context of a belt buckle design, and
they are the sort of innovations that merit design protection.
The ten-year protection period also causes certain problems. Within a given
national market, different designers will pursue varying policies as to how
aggressively they seek design protection. The level of protection they seek will be
based on the quality and scope of their particular designs.'58 Some designs will
go through their useful life in less than ten years. Others need more than ten
years to realize their profit making potential. Yet the system as designed has not
built in any measures for dealing with the differences among inventions. Only
151. Id. at § 1002(4).
152. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1064-65.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1069.
155. Design Act, supra note 24, at § 1002(2).
156. Id.
157. See supra note 75.
158. KAUmR, supra note 9, at 18.
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by incorporating such a system can the balance between providing incentives to
creative design and promoting competition be adequately attained.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE FLAWS IN THE DESIGN INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY ACT OF 1991
While the Design Act does not strike the proper balance between competition
and creative incentive, each of its deficiencies can be remedied. The exclusion of
designs dictated solely by utilitarian function can be made meaningful by replacing
it with an exclusion for articles in which the functional element significantly
predominates over the aesthetic element. While this standard is somewhat vague,
it should not produce a greater amount of litigation. It will merely shift the
focus of litigation from whether the design was dictated solely by the functional
element to whether the functional element predominated over the aesthetic ele-
ment.
This shift in focus is appropriate, as it prevents design protection from being
used to protect the manufacture of products where the functional element
predominates. Returning to our sports car example, 19 the aesthetic element is
clearly distinctive to this design. However, where so many functional considera-
tions go into the product's design, the design's aesthetic elements do not pre-
dominate over its functional elements. The balance between incentive for designers
and promoting competition is best maintained by supporting only those designs
that require support to be competitive with other designs, assuming that both
designs have equivalent functional elements. In the case of our sports car and in
other analogous cases, a significant advance in functional characteristics combined
with an attractive appearance prevent the optimum scenario from being realized.
Granting protection in these cases would deviate from the most efficient level of
protection, and therefore it should not be done. The balancing test between
functional and aesthetic elements would prevent this from occurring by granting
protection only when needed to protect appearance and not function.
Next, the exclusion for staple and commonplace designs can be improved by
incorporating a standard for making this determination. Some designs, such as
standard geometric figures, are commonplace to everyone in all contexts. Other
symbols and patterns may be standard or commonplace to a limited class of
people, or only when they are viewed in certain contexts. It is these designs that
are troublesome, as they should not be protected in those contexts where most
people would consider them ordinary. However, when placed in a different
context, a design may be precisely the type of innovation that the Design Act
should protect.
This problem can best be remedied by incorporating a "reasonable consumer"
standard of review. The standard would have two parts. The first would require
the finder of fact to determine whether a consumer with knowledge of the product
type would identify the design seeking protection with the type of product it is
associated with prior to the time that protection is sought. The second would
require the finder of fact to determine whether a reasonable person would believe
that the product's appearance significantly contributes to its commercial appeal.
159. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
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Admittedly, this standard is not perfect; perhaps the only universal principle
derived from tort law is that reasonable people disagree in their interpretations
of many things. However, the standard excludes those forms that all people agree
are commonplace, such as geometric figures, as well as does the present statutory
language.
While this new standard is as effective as the old one in excluding protection
to universal designs, it improves upon the statutory language in two ways. First,
the current statutory language provides that staple and commonplace designs are
excluded from protection, but does not establish through whose eyes that deter-
mination should be made.160 Incorporating a "consumer with knowledge" stan-
dard remedies this problem. Furthermore, while it requires some background
knowledge of the prior art in the product area, much of this knowledge can be
gained through personal experience. Therefore, the sort of in-depth search for
prior art required for patent protection would not be necessary. Second, it defines
staple and commonplace in terms of the type of product being considered, while
the current statutory language does not. While some designs are commonplace,
they are not commonplace in all contexts, and can provide an aesthetic advantage
when incorporated into an abnormal context. For example, a basketball may be
a commonplace design in many contexts, but a toaster shaped as a basketball
would certainly be novel and arguably deserves protection. To the extent that
this and other designs may be frivolous attempts to obtain protection, the prong
of the test which requires a reasonable person to find that the appearance would
contribute to the products' commercial success would exclude them from the
Act's purview.
Finally, the time period over which protection is extended also presents
problems. While the Design Act affords ten-years' worth of protection, some
designs will take more than ten years to realize commercial success. Still others
will have realized the full extent of their commercial success and become obsolete
in less than ten years. The protection period was set at ten years in an effort to
promote competition. Allowing indefinite protection for an object's appearance
would harm the competitive balance by affording protection that is inconsistent
with the costs of producing a design. 61 While the determination of ten years as
the cutoff point may be arbitrary, the line has to be drawn somewhere, and ten
years should be a sufficient time for most designers to reap the benefits of their
creative endeavors. The more significant problem is that of designs which run
their course in less than ten years. Ten years of protection provides them with
more protection than necessary, and is one of the most expensive forms of
protection possible.162
160. See Design Act, supra note 24, at § 1002(2).
161. See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
162. See KAIFER, supra note 9, at 43. A simple example helps to demonstrate this. Designer A
receives protection for an innovative design. After five years, A has recouped the value of the risk
A undertook in creating the design. Therefore, A has an additional five years of protection that were
not necessary to provide an incentive to create the design. If this protection is afforded, the product
will still be sold at monopolistic prices. Since the monopoly price is greater than the competitive
price, there will be some consumers who will not purchase the product. These consumers will be
denied the benefit of the use of the product and competitive designs are denied entry to the market.
This is not an efficient result.
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This problem can be remedied by making the holders of the design protection
pay periodic renewal fees to maintain their right to protection. This is a concept
that has been utilized in the patent system in many countries, including the
United States. 63 As a result, those patents whose value is less than the marginal
cost of the fee are not renewed. It is interesting to note that few patents stay in
force through their maximum legally permissible lives. 16 A similar system incor-
porated into the Design Act would force the designs to pay for themselves, and
those designs which are unable to do so would be removed from the system.
Again, there are concerns associated with this sort of protection. The renewal
fees must not be so high that they deter designers from entering the market, or
force them out of the market before their designs have an opportunity to pay
for themselves. Since we are less concerned with merit in the design protection
area than we are in the patent field, it seems appropriate to set the fees at some
point less than that charged for patents. Also, while it should not be problematic
to ask major corporations to pay as they go, it may present problems for the
small inventor who doesn't have the resources or the capital to do so. If such a
provision would price the small inventor out of the market, an exception may
have to be written in for designs owned by private individuals and closely held
businesses. However, with these concerns dealt with, a pay-as-you-go system
further ensures that the designs that will be protected are only those which can
be protected without unduly restricting competition.
Statutory protection for the aesthetic aspects of useful articles is necessary.
Without it, the incentive to create is diminished, because one of the features
which makes a product more marketable is its appearance. That appearance, if
it is truly original and distinctive, cannot be adequately protected under existing
legal principles, so it is only appropriate to enact legislation to do so. However,
the legislation in its present form is overly vague and does not determine which
designs can be protected without disturbing the balance between free market
competition and promoting creative design incentives. The changes suggested in
this Note clarify the statute without disrupting this delicate balance.
Joseph DiRienzo
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163. Id. at 13.
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